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iiAbstract
What can be learnt from revisiting the Optimal Currency Areas (OCA) theory 50 
years from its birth, in light of recent advances in open economy macro and monetary 
theory? This paper presents a stylized micro-founded model of the costs of adopting a 
common currency, relative to an ideal benchmark in which domestic monetary 
authorities pursue country-specific efficient stabilization. Costs from (a) limiting 
monetary autonomy and (b) giving up exchange rate flexibility are examined in turn. 
These costs will generally be of the same magnitude as the costs of the business 
cycle. However, to the extent that exchange rates do not perform the stabilizing role 
envisioned by traditional OCA theory, a common monetary policy can be as efficient 
as nationally differentiated policies, even when shocks are strongly asymmetric, 
provided that the composition of aggregate spending tends to be symmetric at union-
wide level. Convergence in consumption (and spending) patterns thus emerges as a 
possible novel attribute of countries participating in an efficient currency area. 
Keywords: Optimum Currency Area, optimal monetary policy, costs of business 
cycle, exchange rate regime, international policy cooperation, New Open Economy 
Macroeconomics.  
JEL classification: E31 
iii1 Introduction 
Economic heterogeneity across regions and countries is, in many ways, a vital sign of 
growing and healthy economies. By the same token, differences in institutions and 
policies may reflect diversity in preferences and political orientations across 
communities in a currency area, consistent with the democratic nature of our 
societies. Nonetheless, the literature on Optimal Currency Areas (henceforth OCA) 
has long emphasized that some elements of economic heterogeneity increase the 
likelihood of a-synchronous business cycle fluctuations at regional level, which 
interfere with the efficient conduct of stabilization policy in a currency area, and in 
principle may prevent a single monetary authority from achieving successfully its 
goals.
The traditional debate pointed out that the likelihood of asymmetric shocks is 
higher in the presence of national differences in product specialization, and/or 
sectoral composition of output. Over the years, the list of relevant asymmetries has 
grown as to include also structural difference which may affect the way a common 
shock is transmitted across regions — such as different degrees of nominal rigidities 
and frictions across sectors and regions (arguably reflecting differences in the pace of 
deregulation and liberalization), or differences in financial structures and labour (and 
goods) market institutions. Policymakers are obviously interested in understanding 
the extent to which they should worry about these specific dimensions of 
heterogeneity, beyond monitoring their role in macroeconomic developments, i.e. in 
determining the output gap and (core) inflation.
1 The European Central Bank is by no 
means the only central bank facing this issue — but national differences and the lack 
of political integration make it more pressing in the euro area than elsewhere. 
In this text, I take a step back from the current debate, and reconsider the very 
foundations of the theory of Optimal Currency Areas (henceforth OCA) drawing on 
recent contributions to stabilization theory in closed and open economies (see for 
instance Woodford 2003, Galì 2008 and especially the vast body of contributions to 
the so-called New Open Economy Macroeconomics after Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 
1996), as surveyed by Corsetti 2008). The objective is to shed light on what we can 
(and did) learn about Optimum Currency Areas adopting a new, modern approach to 
macro stabilization, relative to the body of knowledge already accumulated on the 
1 Recent literature has already provided important insights into this question, for instance by 
developing the standard closed-economy monetary models (e.g., Woodford (2003)), as to encompass 
asymmetry in nominal or financial frictions across sectors or regions (see Benigno (2004) among 
others). 
1foundations laid out by the classical OCA contributions, and the many later 
developments. 
Relative to the traditional literature, the approach pursued in this paper is different 
in at least two important respects. First, all the arguments in the text are derived from 
a stylized micro-founded model in which households maximize expected utility, 
firms maximize expected profits, monetary authorities maximize national welfare, 
indexed by the representative household’s utility. As in the traditional literature, 
however, because of frictions in the goods market (which are not modelled 
explicitly), prices are assumed to be sticky — for simplicity, firms are assumed to 
preset nominal prices for one production period. Second, the analysis is developed 
under the assumption that policymakers can credibly commit to policy rules in either 
exchange rate regimes (currency union, or flexible rates), with the objective of 
maximizing some average of the consumers’ expected utility. Optimal stabilization 
policy is therefore characterized as optimal rules, rather than discretionary reactions 
to shocks — the distinction is not treated explicitly in the original OCA theory. I 
emphasize two main results. 
First, as is well understood, in a monetary union inefficient stabilization of 
national economies is due to (a) insufficient stabilization of domestic marginal 
costs/output gap, and (b) monetary movements unrelated to the fundamentals of a 
country — in a currency union the common monetary stance can be a source of 
demand noise for some members of the union, depending on the degree of symmetry 
of cyclical shocks across countries. An important advantage of a ‘micro-founded’ 
framework consists of making it clear that, from the vantage point of the 
representative national household, the combined welfare cost of insufficient 
stabilization and monetary shocks unrelated to a country’s fundamentals are 
essentially of the same order of magnitude of the costs of the business cycle. It 
follows that if one is sceptical about these costs, he/she must also be sceptical about 
the costs of monetary unification. 
This consideration emphasizes an important open issue in OCA theory. According 
to the stylized model employed in the text, the welfare gap between a monetary union 
and independent monetary policies is consistent with the assessment of the costs of 
the business cycle by Lucas (1987, 2003). Many feel that Lucas’ calculation severely 
underestimates the welfare effects of cyclical fluctuations. Yet the literature has so far 
fallen short of providing a paradigm which radically differs from Lucas’ benchmark 
calculations: much richer models than the one employed in the text end up predicting 
costs that are only marginally higher. Moreover, by no means a sceptical view of the 
stabilization costs after monetary unification is a prerogative of the new ‘micro-
2founded’ literature: Buiter (2000) expresses essentially the same view drawing on the 
IS-LM framework. 
A second result sheds new light on an old debate in OCA theory, concerning the 
extent to which asymmetries in national economic structures and shocks magnify the 
costs of a single monetary policy. To appreciate this result, recall that arguments in 
favour of monetary unions typically build on some criticism of the benefits from 
exchange rate movements as envisioned by the traditional OCA theory. Traditional 
arguments view currency markets as a source of noise and financial instability. 
Recent literature instead point out that nominal rigidities in local currency prevent 
import prices from falling with currency depreciation (see Devereux and Engel 2003 
among others): if import prices remain stable in local currency, exchange rate 
movements cannot foster relative price adjustment. Building on this view, it is indeed 
possible to produce examples in which a common monetary policy is as efficient as 
national differentiated policies, irrespective of specialization in production, and 
independently of the correlation between country-specific shocks. 
The conditions under which such ‘equivalence result’ holds bear an important 
lesson for OCA. Namely, what reduces the gap between monetary policy in a 
common currency area and independent monetary policies is the degree of symmetry 
in the composition of national consumption. One can show that, if there were only 
tradable goods, and consumption baskets were identical across countries, monetary 
unification would not affect the monetary policy stance at national level at all. In light 
of this consideration, convergence in consumption (and spending) patterns emerges 
as a candidate novel attribute of countries participating in an efficient currency area. 
Before proceeding, it is appropriate to clarify what this paper deals and does not 
deal with. The main goal of this paper is to analyze the difference at national level 
between participating in a monetary union and retaining the national currency, 
treating the two regimes on a level playing field. Consistent with this goal, the costs 
of a single monetary policy will be assessed relatively to an ideal benchmark of 
efficient domestic stabilization at country level, and not relative to any historical 
benchmark. In this respect, the analysis abstracts from a wide variety of inefficiencies 
and sources of instability — including some which have arguably played a prominent 
role in the historical process towards the euro, but are not essentially related with the 
adoption of a common currency. For instance, as shown in Section 4.3, the analysis 
does lend support to the view that gains from joining a monetary union are potentially 
sizeable, when participating in the union allows a country to benefit from a better 
(more disciplined) macroeconomic policy framework. However, the text does not 
offer an explicit model of the reasons why countries may be unable to adopt a good 
policy framework on their own. Instead, the exercise provides an assessment of the 
3potential gains from activating (non-monetary) instruments of business cycle 
stabilization at national or union-wide level, including fiscal policy (see e.g. the 
discussion in Adao et al., 2006). 
Second, the analysis de facto assumes that consumption risk is perfectly 
diversified, corresponding to the case of perfect and frictionless financial markets: 
therefore, the text will not discuss the sensitivity of the welfare gap across regimes to 
different degrees of financial market integration and development (on this issue, see 
Sutherland 2004). Financial issues, together with fiscal issues, are briefly touched 
upon in a final section, while factor mobility is ignored altogether. By no means I 
regard these issues as secondary in OCA theory. If anything, they define core 
chapters of a research agenda which has motivated this paper in the first place, and 
hopefully will attract more research in the near future. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the findings of 
traditional theory of Optimal Currency Areas. Section 3 lays out a stylized model of a 
closed-economy to present the foundations of stabilization theory. Section 4 uses this 
model to assess the national welfare costs of losing monetary autonomy, and being 
exposed to monetary policy decisions responding to average fundamentals in the 
union. Section 5 introduces a two-country model, analyzing the international 
transmission mechanism and setting the stage for welfare analysis. Section 6 studies 
optimal stabilization policy under different policy regimes, revisiting the roots of the 
aversion to monetary union by classical authors. Section 7 revisits the OCA theory in 
light of non-traditional views of the international transmission of fundamental and 
policy shocks. Section 8 reconsiders the role of symmetry in economic structures in 
undermining the viability of currency unions. Section 9 discusses some extensions of 
the analysis, including fiscal policy and the policy mix. Section 10 concludes. 
2 From the original theory of Optimal Currency Areas 
to micro-founded analyses of the costs and benefits of 
monetary unification 
The seminal contributions to the so-called Optimal Currency Area theory, including 
Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969), Ingram (1973), analyze the costs 
of adopting a common currency in the presence of asymmetric, country-specific 
temporary shocks and (by logical extension) asymmetric short-run response to 
common temporary and permanent shocks. The well-known argument is that these 
asymmetries weaken the case for a common currency, as members of monetary union 
lose the benefits from 
4(i) monetary autonomy; 
(ii) stabilizing movements of the exchange rate. 
The same literature then stresses that the benefits from (i) and (ii) above are low if 
at least one of the following is true: 
(a) prices and wages are sufficiently flexible; 
(b) fiscal policy effectively stabilizes national economies; 
(c) consumption risk is sufficiently diversified across borders (or international 
financial markets work smoothly, so that agents can easily smooth consumption); 
(d) factors are sufficiently mobile also in the short run, at low private and social 
costs;
(e) there are little asymmetries in shocks and in macroeconomic transmission. 
The original contributions to this theory abstract from other potentially sizeable 
benefits of a monetary union, e.g., benefits from policy delegation, gains from 
political integration (reflecting the opinion that this is more likely in the presence of 
monetary union), saving on transaction costs (possibly increasing trade), and so on. 
These arguments — sometimes included in modern textbooks as extensions of OCA 
beyond its original theoretical boundaries — have arguably played an important role 
in the debate on EMU. For instance, it is well understood that they can explain why 
some small European countries, whose specific cyclical conditions have a very 
limited weight in the European Central Bank’s decisions, have nonetheless been 
eager to adopt the euro. However, following the original contributions to the OCA 
literature, I will abstract from these issues altogether. 
In my discussion, I will re-visit OCA theory in the framework of a stylized choice 
theoretical model of currency union. The model in the background of the analysis is 
specified in Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a, 2005b) and Corsetti (2006) — in this text, I 
will only use a minimal set of analytical expressions referring the reader to these 
references for details and a formal derivation. As is well known, the advantage of this 
model is that it can be solved in closed form. Relative to its original formulation, I 
augment the model with a nontradable good sector (as in Obstfeld and Rogoff 2002), 
and allow for home bias in consumption of tradables (as in Corsetti 2006).
2
The main arguments are developed in two steps. The next section introduces the 
main ideas by using a simplified version of the model, whereas the countries in a 
monetary union are treated as if they were closed economies, i.e. without trade among 
them. Thanks to this simplification, the analysis will focus sharply on the costs of 
losing monetary autonomy, that is, the costs of giving up the possibility of 
implementing monetary stabilization policies specifically tailored to the need of the 
domestic economy. The following sections develop a full model of monetary unions 
2 The full specification of the model and its solution are available at www.eui.eu/Personal/corsetti/
5with trade and financial links among countries, and complete the analysis contrasting 
different views on the benefits from exchange rate flexibility. 
3 Monetary stabilization: basic ideas from a choice-
theoretic model 
This section sketches the main principle of macroeconomic stabilization based on a 
stylized model of an individual country in a monetary union, abstracting from trade in 
goods and assets. For later reference, the country on which I focus the analysis will 
be called the Home country; when appropriate Home variables are denoted with the 
subscript H.
3.1 A stylized closed-economy setup 
Consider a closed economy populated by many identical households, who derive 
utility from consumption of goods, and leisure, i.e. their utility is decreasing in labour 
effort. In the analysis, the expected utility of the national representative household 
provides a natural index of national welfare. 
In the tradition of macroeconomic models, the demand and the supply side of the 
economy are discussed in turn. Consider the demand side first. The dynamic of 
aggregate demand is governed by the optimal consumption-saving and investment 
decisions by Households and firms. For simplicity, as in many modern contributions 
to monetary theory, posit that the aggregate demand coincides with consumption 
expenditure, i.e. abstract from investment and government spending. Let C denote 
domestic aggregate consumption, and P its price (or CPI). Nominal aggregate 
demand is thus given by PC, and real domestic output  H Y  coincides with real 
consumption expenditure, i.e. C = YH.
For the purpose of this paper, it is convenient to relate nominal aggregate demand 
PC to a variable ȝ, which indexes the stance of monetary policy: a higher ȝ means 
that monetary authorities pursue expansionary policies, raising aggregate demand and 
thus nominal consumption. Provided that there are no asset market frictions, the 
dynamic of aggregate demand (in nominal terms) reflecting optimal consumption and 
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6where ȕ is the discount factor reflecting consumers’ impatience, E denotes 
expectations of future variables, indexed by the subscript +1. The above equation 
makes it clear that, for given expectations of future prices and future real demand, 
current spending (corresponding to the current monetary stance) ȝ is decreasing in the 
nominal interest rate. 
As regards the supply side of the model, output is produced in many varieties by (a 
continuum of) small firms, each of them with monopoly power on a specific good 
variety. Production can be written as YH = ZHƐ, where ZH denotes the level of 
productivity, identical across firms, Ɛ denotes employment. Labour productivity ZH is 
assumed to vary randomly at business cycle frequency.  
Each firm faces a product-specific demand for its output with a constant price 
elasticity. Taking into account this demand, firms set their monopolistic prices 
subject to nominal rigidities. Assume for simplicity that firms preset their product 
prices in nominal terms, and keep them fixed for one production period only (say, one 
quarter), adjusting the scale of production to meet demand. The general principle is 
that firms will optimally choose the preset product price which maximizes their 
market value. Under the assumptions underlying our reference model (utility from 
consumption is logarithmic, disutility from labour effort is linear), this leads to a very 
simple and intuitive expression: the optimal preset price results from charging the 
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where the marginal costs  H MC , are given by wage costs per unit of output (i.e. the 
nominal wage divided by productivity); and, by standard results in micro theory, the 
equilibrium markup mkp is a decreasing function of the elasticity of substitution 
across domestically produced varieties of the Home goods. As this price is fixed over 
the production period, the (ex-post) realized markup will obviously vary (inversely) 
with marginal costs. 
To keep the analysis as straightforward as possible, I do not model policy trade-
offs stemming from the coexistence of price and wage rigidities (as in e.g. Erceg et al. 
2000; see also Galí 2008, chapter 6). I therefore posit that the labour market is 
competitive, so that the nominal wage rate moves proportionally with nominal 
consumption, hence with the monetary stance ȝ. The marginal costs can then be 
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a property that will become central to our discussion of stabilization below. 
The description of the model is completed with the characterization of the natural 
rate of employment (or output), that is, the employment (output) rate if all prices were 
flexible. In the absence of nominal rigidities, each firm would maximize current 
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This expression differs from the case of nominal rigidities because all fluctuations of 
nominal marginal costs affect prices ex-post. Substituting the definition of ȝ, the 
production function  H H YZ   ", and re-arranging, yields the result that the natural 
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In the long run,   is decreasing in the degree of monopoly power of domestic firms. 
As goods become better substitutes, or regulation and competition policy reduces 
average markups in the economy, the natural rate of employment and output rise. At 
business cycle frequencies, the natural rate of output obviously fluctuates with 
productivity, i.e.  .
nr "
nr nr
HH YZ   "
3.2 Efficient monetary stabilization 
The above expressions provide the key elements to analyze, in a stylized way, the 
macroeconomic implications of random fluctuations in current and future 
productivity, and the optimal policy response to stabilize the economy. Consider how 
current productivity shocks are transmitted to the economy (demand shocks will be 
discussed below). Holding monetary stance ȝ (hence nominal wages) fixed, a positive 
8productivity shock (an increase in  H Z ) lowers marginal costs ex post. But, if prices 
are preset, firms cannot take advantage of the higher productivity to lower prices and 
raise output: a fixed ȝ implies that aggregate demand is also fixed in nominal and real 
terms. As a result, firms satisfy the current demand using less productive inputs. The 
positive productivity shock opens a positive output gap: employment and output fall 
short of their natural rate, i.e. their equilibrium value in a flexible price allocation. 
In response to an unexpected increase in productivity, however, monetary 
authorities can improve welfare by expanding aggregate demand, up to the level of 
output if prices were flexible. In other words, at given prices, a sufficiently large 
monetary expansion can close the output gap described above, preventing any fall in 
employment relative to the flex-price equilibrium. Observe that, by raising the 
monetary stance in response to a positive productivity shock (and contracting it in 
response to a negative shock, as to rule out over-heating and excessive employment), 
a country’s monetary authorities can completely stabilize marginal costs in nominal 
terms. Provided that they have enough information on current productivity, they can 
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If the above holds, i.e. if private agents expect the central bank to credibly pursue 
rules such that  H Z P  * , optimal prices would remain constant in nominal terms also 
in the absence of nominal rigidities, as there would be no difference between the 
expressions (4) and (2). By pursuing monetary rules satisfying the above condition, 
the monetary authorities make nominal rigidities inconsequential as regards the 
equilibrium allocation, in the sense that in each period the sticky price allocation 
coincides with the flex-price allocation. The economy operates at the natural rate. 
Observe that (6) requires a central bank to commit to (a) align aggregate demand 
with productivity, responding within each period to current productivity fluctuations; 
and (b) keep the price level along a predetermined path, indexed by ī. By way of 
example: a credible inflation target of 2 percent would translate into a growth rate of 





 (see Adao et al. 2005 for an analysis of 
determinacy). 
For the simple economy specified above, it is easy to show that policies 
implementing the flex-price allocation also maximize welfare, i.e. the expected utility 
9of the representative agent. While this result does not hold in more general models, 
the literature has nonetheless produced several examples of economies where a 
natural-rate policy would not produce appreciable losses relative to the optimal 
policy.
3.3 Interest rates and demand stabilization 
In the language of traditional models of stabilization, the optimal policy condition 
characterized above prescribes central banks to ‘lean against the wind of excess 
demand (opening output gaps).’ This section elaborates on this point. Specifically, 
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This expression suggests a different way to state the main conclusion of the analysis 
in the previous subsection. Namely, given the path of price levels ī to which the 
central bank commits when it defines inflation targets at different horizons, and 
holding expectation of future productivity constant, the natural rate of interest falls 
with current productivity gains — which, in the absence of a contingent optimal 
reaction by monetary authorities, would open a positive output gap. It raises with 
anticipated productivity growth. 
It is important to understand that condition (6) prescribes monetary authorities to 
respond efficiently not only to current productivity shocks, but also to current 
3 Taking logs of the expression in the text and rearranging, yields the nominal interest rate 


















The expression in the text follows from assuming that shocks are log-normally distributed.
10aggregate demand disturbances. To see this point most clearly, suppose that in some 
periods private agents become more optimistic, or pessimistic, about the future state 
of the economy. Specifically, they receive an informative signal about the level of 
productivity one period ahead, which can be expected to be either high or low. This is 
a type of expectations shocks which is reminiscent of traditional Keynesian theory, 
where movements in the so-called autonomous components of spending for 
consumption and investment are driving forces of business cycle fluctuations. 
For a given path of prices (the īƍs) and interest rates over time, the expressions (1) 
and (7) make it apparent that fluctuations in expectations of future productivity 
translate into fluctuations in future incomes and consumption demand  ; in turn 
(holding current interest rate fixed) this moves current real aggregate demand C away 
from the natural rate. For instance, given 
1 C
1  *  and i, optimistic expectations raise 
demand above natural output, opening a positive output gap. 
A central bank implementing optimal rules   H Z P  *  however would 
systematically and completely stem any excess demand on current resources, 
including those driven by anticipation of future growth. Under the optimal monetary 
regime, the nominal rate indeed rises with  ,1 ln H EZ  , causing households to 
postpone optimally the spending plans they would have pursued in response to 
optimistic expectations, had the nominal rate been left constant. Without investment 
and international borrowing, whether or not private expectations turn out to be correct 
ex post is utterly inconsequential for the evolution of the economy. Given the optimal 
rule, in the next period the policy stance will be such that households again consume 
the efficient level of output.
4
Note that, in addition to signals about future average productivity, current demand 
would also fluctuate inefficiently with uncertainty about future productivity, i.e. with 
changes in the variance term in (8). Monetary authorities are obviously required to 
stabilize fluctuations in demand also when these are driven by perceived uncertainty. 
An observation on the so-called zero bound problem is in order before closing this 
section. As is well known, according to (8) the implementation of optimal 
stabilization policy may at times require that nominal interest rate be negative, if the 
economy is hit by a sufficiently large negative shock to, say, expected productivity 
growth. In such circumstances, the implementation of optimal stabilization rules 
would be constrained by the fact that nominal rates cannot fall below zero. Holding 
4 The presence of capital as productive input and investment shocks do not necessarily modify this 
conclusion — see for instance Bergin and Corsetti (2005). 
11the price level target constant, monetary authorities would not be able to keep 
efficient control of aggregate demand. 
4 The costs of losing monetary autonomy 
It is well understood that a welfare-optimizing central bank in a monetary union 
should react to the average cyclical conditions of the common currency area. While 
there could be different views on the weighting scheme used in building area-wide 
averages, a single (optimal) monetary policy will not be able to stabilize fully output 
gaps and producers’ marginal costs at national level — as crudely captured by the 
slogan ‘one size cannot fit all’. To the extent that it translates into insufficient 
stabilization, the costs of monetary union are clearly akin to the costs of the business 
cycle.
Since insufficient stabilization of national cycles is a dimension of the cost from 
monetary unification which has received a very large share of attention in the debate, 
it is useful to start our analysis by focusing sharply on it, before moving to other 
dimensions. 
4.1 Heterogeneous monetary union and the welfare costs of the 
business cycle 
The main inefficiencies from insufficient stabilization can be characterized in 
terms of relative price distortions, translating into a suboptimal level of output and 
consumption. According to the model discussed above, if the central bank does not 
stabilize marginal costs completely, at national level demand does not fall optimally 
when productivity is low: with preset prices, these turn out to be too high relative to 
factor costs, and firms supply too much relative to the flex-price level of output. 
Conversely, when productivity is high, demand does not rise enough: product prices 
are too low relative to factor costs, and firms supply too little relative to the flex-price 
allocation. It follows that, with insufficient stabilization, average output will fall short 
of its flex-price counterpart.
To derive these results formally, set for simplicity ī=1 and 
,0 H Z 1
[ P [  d d       ( 9 )  
When [ <1, stabilization is incomplete: demand varies too little relative to 
productivity, translating into positive or negative output gaps. Under this 
12parameterization, it is easy to verify that the expected value of marginal costs will be 
larger than in the case of complete stabilization
5
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For any given average monetary stance, the lower the extent of stabilization, the 
higher the preset product prices. Now consider the limiting case [ =0, when monetary 
policy is not contingent on the state of the economy at all — this would be the case if 
money grows at some predetermined rate between periods. Holding ȝ constant, it is 
easy to see that higher prices translate into a lower constant level of consumption and 
output as  / H H CY P H P     (see also the discussion in Section 9 on related results 
when price setting is staggered). 
The property of recent monetary models just discussed should be properly 
emphasized: with nominal rigidities, incomplete stabilization affects average prices, 
consumption and output in equilibrium. For standard parameterization, average prices 
will be too high, average output and consumption of Home goods (as well as average 
wages) will be too low relative to the flex-price benchmark. Observe, however, that 
the growth rate of the economy is not affected: in the long run the economy will 
expand at the same rate of productivity growth, independently of the monetary 
regime. Yet, there will be a gap between potential and current output on average, 
depending on the monetary regime.
6
What is the cost of inefficient stabilization in terms of welfare? As already 
mentioned, this will simply coincide with the cost of inefficient business cycle 
movements. To see this most clearly, assume that  H Z  is lognormally distributed. In 
our model, with utility from consumption being in log form, i.e.  ln ln C
p
P
  , the loss 
in expected log consumption due to incomplete stabilization — denoted   — can 
be written as follows:
W '
7
5 Technically, the inequality above follows as a straightforward implication of Jensen’s inequality. 
6 In joint work with Bergin, I show that models including both firms’ entry and nominal price rigidities 
confirm the main result of this section, namely, lack of stabilization raises the price level (Bergin and 
Corsetti 2005). In addition, the model suggests that insufficient stabilization at national level reduces 
the number of firms created in equilibrium, depressing the level of investment relative to the flex-price 
allocation benchmark. 
7 Define welfare with flexible prices (or in a fully stabilized economy) 
flex W  as
13
2 1 1l n
2
H WV a r [ '   Z     (11) 
When ȟ = 1 the economy is fully stabilized: the variance of the shock does not affect 
expected utility from consumption, and the above expression is identically equal to 
zero. If ȟ < 1, instead, expected utility will be decreasing in the variance of the shock. 
Not surprisingly, expression (11) is very close to the formula expressing the costs 
of business cycles in the seminal contributions by Lucas (1987, 2003).
8 Indeed, many 
models currently used in the design and assessment of monetary stabilization policy 
share this very feature. As in Lucas, back-of-the-envelope calculations of the order of 
magnitude of the welfare costs of insufficient stabilization lead to very small 
estimates. To wit: let the standard deviation of productivity be 1 percent per period. 
Moving from no stabilization ȟ = 0 to full stabilization ȟ = 1 is worth approximately 
one half of a hundredth of a percent of consumption per quarter.
9 Adding some 
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Consider now the case of sticky prices under the assumption  H
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The expression in the text is the difference between the two. 
8 In standard monetary models, the goal of stabilization is not to eliminate consumption variability 
around a smooth trend. Rather, the goal of stabilization is to reduce the gap between consumption and 
its efficient level —- which may well be time varying depending on the state of the economy. In the 
model underlying the calculations above, full stabilization completely closes the output gap, ensures 
that employment is at its flex-price rate, and lets consumption fluctuate optimally with the state of the 
economy. Conversely, a constant P  (or P  growing at a deterministic rate) will imply that 
consumption is constant, but at a lower average relative to a perfectly stabilized economy. Somewhat 
paradoxically, it is incomplete stabilization which makes consumption ‘smoother’ relative to a flex-
price economy, but suboptimally so. At the same time, it induces excessive volatility of employment. 
9 In Bergin and Corsetti (2005), we also allow for product diversification and love for variety. In such 
a model, business fluctuations reduce product variety available to consumers. The costs of insufficient 
14preference shocks to the model may marginally raise this estimate, but not 
substantially so. 
Not only these numbers are strikingly low: remarkably, the above estimates 
actually provide an upper bound to the welfare losses due to insufficient stabilization 
in a common currency, derived for the case in which domestic productivity shocks 
have no common component across countries, i.e. they are purely idiosyncratic.
10
The parameter ȟ above can be interpreted as the weight assigned by a common central 
bank to the stabilization of the output gap in country H.
Sure enough, the issue of assessing the (welfare) costs of the business cycle is far 
from being settled. The literature provides examples of frictions and inefficiencies 
which can raise their assessment relative to Lucas’ estimates. In addition, low 
aggregate welfare losses may correspond to large losses for some group in the 
society. Yet, the main message of this section is apparent. 
The analysis suggests a close link between the magnitude of welfare gains from 
stabilizing the business cycle, and the magnitude of welfare costs due to a single 
monetary policy. If one is sceptical about the former, he/she must be sceptical about 
the latter.
11  It is worth noting, here, that similarly sceptical views of the welfare costs 
of monetary union had been expressed early on by critics of the OCA theory using 
the same theoretical model underlying the original contributions to this theory, most 
notably by Willem Buiter (see for instance Buiter (2000)). 
stabilization is higher, depending on preferences for variety (see Ghironi and Melitz 2005, Corsetti, 
Martin and Pesenti 2005, among others).
10 Obviously, the cost of a single currency will be decreasing in the degree of symmetry of productivity 
shocks hitting the different regions of the monetary union. Similarly, it is well understood that the cost 
of joining a currency area will not be symmetric. For instance, ceteris paribus, it will be higher for 
smaller countries, i.e. countries whose macroeconomic conditions have a small weight in the union-
wide aggregates used by the central bank to assess the macroeconomic conditions of the area as a 
whole. 
11 In the discussion of this paper during the conference EMU@10, many voiced the widespread 
opinion according to which the costs of the business cycle is larger than predicted by most standard 
models — a concern that has motivated quite a bit of theoretical and empirical work. Unfortunately, 
none of the contributions mentioned in the discussion succeeds in accounting for more than a marginal 
upward revision of the standard calculation. The literature may eventually provide convincing models 
predicting large average welfare losses from the business cycle. It is worth stressing that, in this case, it 
would still be important to verify that the welfare gap between monetary union and national currencies 
is correspondingly large. 
154.2 Country-specific monetary ‘noise’ 
So far, we have discussed the implications of a single monetary policy in terms of 
insufficient domestic stabilization. However, from the vantage point of a country 
whose business cycle is not synchronized with the rest of the union, a common 
monetary policy also generates destabilizing ‘monetary noise’. 
For this reason, a common currency could potentially be more consequential for 
national welfare than suggested above. Accounting for monetary noise, rewrite 
expression (9) as follows 
H H Z
[ P  * :
where H : indexes changes in the union-wide monetary stance which are unrelated to 
the Home country’s fundamental  H Z . This new variable captures policy decisions by 
the common central bank, in response to average fundamentals in the currency union. 
If H Z  and  H :  are independently lognormally distributed, the welfare costs of 
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    (12) 
Welfare losses are obviously higher than (11). However, to the extent that monetary 
authorities follow optimal rules,  H :  reflects some weighted average of country-
specific domestic productivity shocks in the union as a whole. Thus, in the expression 
above, the magnitude of the two terms in square brackets cannot be very different. It 
follows that ‘monetary noise’ due to lack of business cycle synchronization in a 
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16monetary union can hardly raise the order of country-specific welfare losses, relative 
to our assessment of the costs from incomplete stabilization. 
4.3 Monetary instability and the advantages of joining a 
disciplined monetary union 
An important observation suggested by expression (12) is that a highly unstable 
monetary policy could potentially produce large welfare losses, up to dwarfing the 
costs of insufficient stabilization. The point is that the variance of  H :  can rise 
substantially in the presence of noisy behaviour by central bankers, and/or monetary 
instability due to fiscal or financial instability.— in more general specification of the 
model, the size of welfare losses will be sensitive to the degree of risk aversion of the 
representative agents, which magnifies the effects of non-fundamental nominal 
volatility.
13
The strong welfare implications of an unstable monetary policy back a well-known 
argument which, historically, has played an important role in the political process 
towards the creation of the European monetary union. Namely, countries that are 
unable to adopt a stable monetary framework (for a variety of reasons) are bound to 
gain the most from joining a union that guarantees monetary and fiscal discipline. 
As monetary instability plausibly reflects a weak macroeconomic and/or political 
framework, however, assessing these gains requires a careful specification of what 
prevents national monetary authorities from following optimal rules consistent with 
the analysis in Sections 3 — a task beyond the goal of this text. 
5 Adding the costs of giving up exchange rate flexibility 
Having clarified some basic ideas about the costs of losing monetary autonomy, the 
next step consists of reconsidering the second element of OCA theory — the 
consequences of giving up exchange rate flexibility — using a fully-fledged model of 
international macroeconomic interdependence. What follows will briefly describe the 
main elements of a general equilibrium, two-country, choice-theoretic stochastic 
model with nominal rigidities and imperfect competition in production. 
13 It is worth noting here that the assumptions underlying the baseline model above actually rule out 
costs of monetary shocks via mispricing of goods and services: optimally preset prices do not depend 
on the variance of monetary policy. For more general specifications of preferences and technology, 
however, a noisy conduct of monetary policy would also affect average prices. 
175.1 A model with trade and international interdependence 
Consider a model of macroeconomic interdependence consisting of two countries, 
Home and Foreign, denoted by H and F, each perfectly specialized in the production 
of a tradable good (in many varieties), and a nontradable good (also in many 
varieties). The Home representative household combines these goods in a 
consumption basket, which may take the following form: 
1 ,,
1
H FN H F N CC CCC C C C
J DD J  ªº ªº ¬¼ ¬¼       (13) 
where H C , F C  and   denote consumption of Home tradables, Foreign tradables 
and Home nontradables, respectively. Note that, in the model I use to develop my 
arguments, tradable and nontradable goods have unit elasticity of substitution in 
consumption, i.e. the consumption aggregator is Cobb-Douglas. The weight of 
nontraded goods is 1 - Ȗ, so that Ȗ is the weight on the basket of traded goods. Within 
this basket, also Home and Foreign traded goods have unit elasticity, with weights Į
and 1 - Į. Foreign consumption is similarly defined 
N C
  
1 * **** * * * ,, HFN H F N CC C CC C C C
1 DD J J
 ªº ªº ¬¼ «» ¬¼
      (14) 
where an asterisk denotes foreign variables. Comparing the two expressions above 
shows that preferences over tradable goods are assumed to be asymmetric across 
countries: national representative consumers assign the same weight Į to the goods 
produced in the country where they live. If Į > 1/2, preferences for tradables have a 
‘home bias’. Preferences for consumption are in log form and additive separable in 
labour — the disutility from labour effort Ɛ is linear (as in the previous section). I 
again abstract from investment and government consumption. 
In the economy, labour is employed in the production of tradables and 
nontradables. We therefore have four measure of labour productivity, each subject to 
shocks that are country- as well as sector- specific:  H Z , N Z , F Z ,
*
N Z  denoting 
productivity in the Home tradable sector, the Home nontradable sector, the Foreign 
tradable sector, the Foreign nontradable sector, respectively. Labour is immobile 
across borders. 
Let , N P H P  and   denote the Home prices of nontraded goods, Home produced 





H P  and   are the 
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18corresponding prices in foreign currency. The welfare-based consumer price indexes 
P (in Home currency for the Home country) and P
 (in Foreign currency for the 
Foreign country) combine the prices of domestic goods and imports 
*** ,, ,, H FN HFN PP PP P P P PP P
 ªº ªº ¬¼ ¬¼         (15) 
Let H  denote the nominal exchange rate between the Home and the Foreign 
currency (measured in units of Home currency per unit of Foreign currency). To the 
sake of analytical tractability, I assume that households can perfectly insure 
consumption risks across countries.
14  As mentioned above, this means that the model 
leaves no room for improvements in welfare through the development of financial 
markets — an issue often discussed in reference to Optimal Currency Areas. 
With efficient consumption risk sharing, exchange rate determination is 
straightforward. As is well known, perfect consumption insurance implies that the 
growth rates of marginal utilities are equalized across countries in Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) terms. As our two countries are perfectly symmetric ex ante, in the 
stylized model I am using in this paper this condition means that wealth and 
consumption are always equalized in nominal terms across countries: 
** . PCP C H         ( 1 6 )  
As explained above, it is convenient to define nominal demand as a synthetic 
indicator of domestic monetary stance — whatever the instruments used by the 
central bank. Abstracting from government spending and investment, nominal 
demand coincides with nominal consumption 
** , PC P C
* P P   
An increase in P (
* P ) corresponds to Home (Foreign) monetary policy expansion. 
Using the definition of P and 
* P , it follows that the exchange rate depends on Home 
and Foreign monetary stances 
14 In the Corsetti-Pesenti model (as in Cole and Obstfeld 1991) equilibrium terms of trade movements 
are such that, independently of whether asset markets are complete (but provided there is no 
outstanding net debt), cross-border consumption risk sharing is efficient. So the solution in the text 




H          ( 1 7 )  
If the two countries adopt a fixed exchange rate regime, then 
* P P   .
5.2 Nominal rigidities and the local currency price stability of 
imports
In our stylized model, domestic firms selling in the domestic market optimally 
preset prices by charging a constant mark-up over expected marginal costs, according 
to (2). This will be true both in the Home and in the Foreign country. However, 
modelling nominal rigidities in the export markets requires additional assumptions 
about the elasticity of prices to exchange rate movements. The literature has 
emphasized that the macroeconomic allocation will depend crucially on this elasticity 
(e.g. see Corsetti and Pesenti 2005a). 
Several contributions have emphasized the radically different macroeconomic 
implications of two alternative hypotheses, ‘Producer Currency Pricing’ (PCP) versus 
‘Local Currency Pricing’ (LCP). According to the former hypothesis, foreign firms 
preset prices in their own currency, and let the Home currency price of their goods 
move one-to-one with the exchange rate. The prices that maximize the value of the 










      ( 1 8 )  
where
*
F MC  denotes foreign marginal costs (in foreign currency). In this case, the 
exchange rate pass-through into Home import prices is clearly 100 percent. Nominal 
rigidities do not prevent flexibility of import prices, in response to shocks which 
appreciate or depreciate the currency. Observe that the law of one price holds exactly, 
because of the assumption that demand elasticities are identical in the two national 
markets. 
‘Local Currency Pricing’ instead corresponds to the case in which exports prices 
are preset in the currency of the destination markets. Foreign firms thus preset two 














      ( 1 9 )  
As Foreign goods prices are preset in local currency, exchange rate pass-through is 
zero. Exchange rate movements translate into deviations from the law of one price, 
since in general 
*
FF PP H z .
15
The macroeconomic effects of a given monetary policy rule vastly differ 
depending on export pricing behaviour. To see this most clearly, rewrite the prices of 
Foreign goods in the home market expressing marginal costs in terms of the two 
indicators of monetary stance P  and 
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In each period, Home import prices in the Home currency vary one-to-one with 
movements in the exchange rate induced by Home monetary policy. A domestic 
monetary expansion results into a higher nominal price of Foreign goods in the Home 
market (and a correspondingly lower nominal price of Home goods in the Foreign 
market). These price movements redirect global demand towards Home goods, and 
away from Foreign goods: exchange rate movements have ‘expenditure switching 
effects’. Yet, as apparent from the above expression, when expressed in Foreign
currency Foreign prices are totally independent of Home monetary policy. Indeed, 
under PCP, perfect pass-through implies that Foreign firms’ unit revenue and 
marginal costs are completely insulated from the Home monetary stance. 
Policy trade-offs are potentially different in the LCP model. In this case, a Home 
nominal depreciation following a Home monetary expansion has no expenditure 
switching effects: relative prices faced by consumers are preset. It does however 
lower the revenues Foreign firms earn on each unit of goods sold in the Home 
market: a Home currency depreciation worsens the Foreign country’s terms of trade. 
Thus, it is not surprising that preset import prices in Home currency do depend on 
Home monetary policy. 
15 Note the difference in the currency denomination of the marginal costs in the above expressions. In 
the case of  , the Foreign marginal costs are expressed in Home currency.  , Ft P
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In other words, the policy pursued by Home monetary authorities directly affects 
optimal export pricing by Foreign firms. For the very reason studied in the previous 
section, exchange rate volatility that is unrelated to Foreign productivity fluctuations 
will translate into higher import prices in the Home country. 
5.3 From macroeconomic analysis to policy assessment and 
design
One of the most appealing features of the model is its tractability for welfare 
analysis. Thanks to well-educated assumption on preferences and technology, in a 
rational expectations equilibrium the expected utility in any given period can be 
approximated by looking at expected log consumption only: 
> @ ln WE C           ( 2 2 )  
This is clearly not general. However, the model captures essential policy trade-offs at 
the core of the stabilization debate, as well as the focus of this contribution. Now, 
recall that consumption can be written as the ratio between the monetary stance for 
the economy P  (i.e. the level of aggregate nominal spending) and the price level. 
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where t.i.p. stands for terms independent of policy. The corresponding expression for 
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 (24) 
22Observe that all we need to know to characterize optimal policies is the equilibrium 
expression for the optimal preset prices (shown in the previous subsection).
16
Optimal stabilization policies are fully characterized by solving the problem of 
two national monetary authorities whose objective is to maximize domestic welfare, 
assuming that these authorities can commit to policy rules and these are perfectly 
credible. I comment on these conditions below. As the optimal policy varies 
depending on the international arrangements between the two authorities, I consider 
three regimes. The first is the Nash equilibrium: the two authorities act independently 
of each other, each setting the domestic monetary stance taking the monetary stance 
abroad as given; the second is international policy coordination: the two authorities 
maximize a joint welfare function; the third is monetary union, which is different 
from coordination in that there is only one monetary instrument, so that P P
   .
17
To characterize optimal policies, I will study which monetary stance P  and P

maximizes the objective function given by (23) and (24). 
6 At the root of the aversion to currency unions 
A first set of results from our analysis sheds light on the root of the aversion to 
currency unions expressed by economists who share the classical view of 
international transmission — as exemplified by Friedman (1953). According to such 
view, exchange rate movements are efficient substitutes for international relative 
price adjustment, when nominal rigidities prevent price flexibility in domestic 
currency. If exchange rates regulate international relative prices, giving up flexibility 
is obviously costly. 
16 It should be stressed here that, for simplicity, the analysis ignores utility or other gains from liquidity 
services. The analysis thus abstracts from considerations that could make it optimal to follow the 
Friedman rule (see Adao, Correia and Teles 2003). 
17 In a Nash equilibrium, the Home policymaker problem is 
Max EW P
taking P





taking P as given. With international policy coordination, the joint problem is 
, Max EW EW
PP

 ªº  ¬¼ .
In a monetary union, the problem is the same as above, subject to the constraint P P
   .
23To revisit this fundamental critique of monetary unification, consider the model 
under the assumption of ‘producer currency pricing,’ whereas  F P is sticky, but the 
price of imports in Home currency  F P  moves one-to-one with the exchange 
rate: F F PP H    . In this case, the objective functions of monetary authorities are 
obtained by substituting (18) into the price index (15). 
Nash equilibrium   Consider first the case of two national authorities acting 
independently (the case of a Nash equilibrium). In this economy, each of them will 
find it optimal to stabilize a weighted average of marginal costs in the two production 
sectors of the economy (nontradable and tradable). As we have seen above that, with 
PCP, average import prices do not depend on domestic monetary policy, the optimal 
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This states that the optimal monetary policy is a function of domestic shocks only. 
Home monetary authorities optimally choose an expansionary stance (raising P ) in 
response to positive productivity shocks in either sector of the domestic economy 
(either N Z  or  H Z ). National central banks are only concerned with domestic policy 
trade-offs (Home monetary authorities do not respond to  N Z
  or  F Z ): there is no 
‘international dimension’ in monetary policymaking. The reason why with PCP 
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24policymakers are not concerned with foreign shocks is that, once optimal monetary 
rules are in place, the implied exchange rates fluctuations automatically move relative 
prices in the right direction, at no cost. For instance, any positive supply shock to 
tradables in the Foreign economy is matched by a foreign expansion, appreciating the 
Home currency. The exchange rate response lowers the relative price of Foreign 
tradables in the global economy, switching domestic and world demand towards 
Foreign output. This is exactly what would happen in a flex-price (efficient) 
equilibrium. 
A common currency  P P
    cannot be optimal in this environment. To see this, 
combine the expressions above, as to derive the equilibrium exchange rate 
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        (26) 
In general, there is no solution for P P
   . The exception is the (obviously 
implausible) case of two identical economies where shocks are also perfectly 
symmetric both across countries and across sectors. Clearly, adopting fixed 
exchange rates has a cost in terms of stabilization: in a monetary union the central 
bank cannot stabilize four marginal costs with a single instrument. These costs are 
arguably falling in the correlation among shocks. 
Observe that, because of sectoral asymmetries, similar considerations also apply to 
domestic stabilization. Unless the sectoral shocks are perfectly correlated at domestic 
level, the central bank will not be able to stabilize both aggregate demand and the 
relative demand for the tradables and nontradables with a single instrument. 
Benevolent policy makers will maximize over the resulting policy trade-offs, reacting 
more to shocks hitting the largest sector, and de facto placing more weight on the 
sector with the highest variance of shocks. 
Coordination    If policy rules are jointly determined as to maximize 
the sum of welfare in the two countries, the fact that import prices in a country do not 
depend on the monetary stance in that country implies that monetary authorities are 
still completely inward looking, in the sense that they only stabilize the marginal 
costs in the two sectors of the domestic economy. Yet optimal monetary policies will 
generally differ from the case of the Nash equilibrium, implying that there are gains 
from international policy coordination. Indeed, it can be shown that, in comparison 
25with the non-coordinated case, monetary authorities react relatively more to shocks in 
the non-traded-good sector. This is because, according to the classical view of the 
international transmission mechanisms, a monetary expansion in one country worsens 
the country’s terms of trade, thus favouring consumers abroad: hence, the 
international spillovers from monetary policy are positive. In the Nash equilibrium, 
the Home monetary authorities ignore these spillovers when solving the policy 
problem: they react too little to shocks to nontradables. For this reason, it follows 
that, in general, gains from coordination do not provide an argument in favour of 
limiting exchange rate flexibility.  
Monetary union    As discussed in Section 4, a common currency imposes 
losses in national welfare, due to both insufficient domestic stabilization, and 
destabilizing monetary shocks. The fully-fledged model provides a better analytical 
characterization of ‘monetary noise.’ Consider a common central bank interested in 
maximizing an equally weighted average of Home and Foreign welfare. With a 
common currency the optimal monetary policy rule becomes a function of all shocks 
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 (27) 
From the vantage point of the Home country, the common monetary policy stabilizes 
domestic output and marginal costs only to the extent that is driven by the first two 
terms on the right-hand side of this expression. Systematic policy responses to the last 
two terms translate into monetary noise — as already anticipated discussing (12). The 
opposite is true from the vantage point of the Foreign country. 
7 Are there benefits from monetary autonomy when 
exchange rate movements do not stabilize 
international prices? 
In the previous section, we have seen that at the root of the classical aversion to 
monetary union is a positive view of exchange rate movements, according to which 
exchange rate adjustment is driven by changes in economic fundamentals (in the 
26model above, exchange rates move with relative productivity shocks), and regulates 
the global demand for a country’s products (inducing expenditure switching effects). 
However, the traditional view of international transmission has been strongly 
questioned by authors who cast doubts on the stabilization properties of the exchange 
rate. Namely, an important strand of the literature stresses the empirical evidence on 
the local currency price stability of imports, i.e., on the fact that the price in domestic 
currency of Foreign goods tends to move very little with the exchange rate (see 
Corsetti 2008 for a survey). The observed local currency price stability of imports 
arguably reflects both real factors and nominal rigidities.
19  But to the extent that this 
is due to nominal rigidities, we have seen above that exchange rate movements do not 
help correcting international relative prices (they have no ‘expenditure switching 
effect’). Actually, they tend to make the international transmission of monetary 
policy harmful ex-post: a Home depreciation worsens the Foreign terms of trade, 
raising equilibrium foreign labour for every level of Foreign consumption. 
Nash equilibrium and coordination  When both domestic and import prices 
are sticky (and preset in local currency), expected utility should be evaluated using 
import prices given by expression (20). As apparent from this expression, under LCP 
import prices depend on the domestic monetary regime. The behaviour of domestic 
monetary authorities influences expected marginal costs, thus average prices, charged 
by foreign exporters in the local market. It follows that the optimal domestic 
monetary policy will react also to productivity shocks abroad, in addition to domestic 
shocks, with an intensity that is increasing in the weight of imports in the national 
consumption basket:
20
19 Real factors include distributive trade, difference in preferences generating differences in elasticities 
across markets, vertical and horizontal interactions in non-competitive markets, or other factors 
creating scope for optimal price discrimination. 
20 To wit, optimal policy stances satisfy 
27,, ,, ,, HFN HFN LCP Nash LCP Nash Z ZZ ZZZ PP PP
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Relative to the PCP case, optimal monetary policies are no longer ‘inward-looking’.  
In this sense, as discussed in previous work with Pesenti (Corsetti and Pesenti 
2005b), nominal frictions in local currency provide an argument in favour of an 
‘international dimension’ in the optimal design of monetary policy rules. Also, 
relative to the PCP case, the fact that optimal policies now depend on shocks abroad 
make national monetary stances more symmetric. Symmetry in monetary stance in 
turn implies a lower volatility of the nominal exchange rate. This result is hardly 
surprising, given that with LCP exchange rate movements do not have any desirable 
effects on international relative prices, i.e. they are not associated with the 
‘expenditure switching effects’ described in the previous section.
An important example    As an extreme example, the literature has long 
noted that the policy reaction functions (28) actually become identical, if tradables 
are the only goods delivering utility (i.e.,  1 J o ), and national consumers demand an 
equally weighted basked of domestic and foreign- produced goods, i.e.  1/2 D    (see 
Devereux and Engel 2003 and Corsetti and Pesenti 2005a). Under these conditions, it 
can be shown that optimal stabilization implies no movement in exchange rates 
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         (29) 
In other words, under the conditions spelled out above, a fixed exchange rate is by no 
means an impediment to optimal stabilization. Whether or not the two monetary 
authorities act independently, monetary stances are symmetric, ruling out exchange 
rate variability altogether. 
The main lesson to draw from the above example is that the stability of import 
prices in local currency in the form of LCP generally causes monetary authorities to 
dampen exchange rate volatility in equilibrium. Since exchange rate movements are 
not useful to correct relative prices, one can even build examples of economies in 
which these movements can be shut down altogether at no cost.
Conversely, a lesson which should not be drawn from the above example is that 
local currency pricing (and the implied absence of expenditure switching effects from 
exchange rate movements) provide a case against monetary autonomy and exchange 
rate flexibility. The stability of import prices in local currency per se does not imply 
that national central banks would find it optimal to stabilize the same weighted 
average of Home and Foreign marginal costs (thus prices), as to make optimal 
monetary policies symmetric. 
First, stabilizing domestic and foreign costs in the tradable sector are not the only 
relevant policy trade-off faced by monetary authorities: a large share of domestic 
output consists of nontradables. Even if the consumption baskets of tradables were 
identical across border ( 1/2 D   ), shocks to the nontradable sector would break the 
symmetry in optimal policy — this is the essence of the critique of Devereux and 
Engel (2003) by Duarte and Obstfeld (2004).
21
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, many empirical contributions taking a 
microeconomic perspective on exporters’ behaviour emphasize price discrimination 
and distribution over nominal rigidities, as the main determinants of the observed low 
elasticity of retail prices to the exchange rate (see Golberg and Verboven 2001). If 
low exchange rate pass-through cannot be attributed to nominal rigidities, the above 
results do not apply (Corsetti and Dedola 2005). Whether or not consumption baskets 
are identical, a fixed exchange rate would unduly constrain on the optimal conduct of 
stabilization policy. 
21 By the same token, in models with capital accumulation symmetry breaks down when shocks 
generate nation-specific investment dynamics. 
298 A new perspective on an old debate: asymmetric 
shocks and the relative efficiency of a common 
monetary policy 
In the literature on OCA, some authors (most notably, Krugman 1993) have 
argued that the scope and likelihood of asymmetric shocks are linked to the degree of 
production specialization across areas. With specialization --- the argument goes ---
any industry-specific shock will also be region-specific, raising the stabilization costs 
of monetary unification. If the economic structure is instead symmetric across 
countries, industry-specific shocks will affect all regions in the union in the same 
way, reducing the strain on the central bank (see the text after expression (26) above). 
Now, the previous section has presented an admittedly extreme example at odds 
with Krugman’s argument, that complete specialization raises the costs of monetary 
unification because of its implications for the scope and likelihood of asymmetric 
shocks. If (a) all goods are tradable, (b) tradable goods have the same weight in the 
consumption basket in the union, and (c) before monetary unification import prices 
are sticky in local currency, the exchange rate remains optimally fixed, even if 
countries are perfectly specialized and shocks are asymmetric. This is so, because 
Home and the Foreign monetary authority react to the same average of domestic and 
foreign shocks: optimal monetary policy in the union will do no worse than 
independent monetary policy at national level. In this sense, there is no cost in 
renouncing national currencies.
Which symmetry matters?    On logical ground, these considerations 
show that production specialization and asymmetries in economic structures are not 
necessarily inconsistent with the comparative efficiency of a common currency. 
Observe that without nontradables and with symmetry in tradable consumption 
( 1 J o  and  1/2 D   ), the share of consumption expenditure on each national good is 
identical to the share of each good in the total value added produced by the two 
countries. By way of example, setting the value of the union GDP equal to 1, each 
country produces half of it. Symmetry between consumption and the (endogenous) 
value of production is essential for the strong result of optimality of fixed exchange 
rates derived in the previous section. Under LCP, it is the breaking down of this
symmetry that makes exchange rate flexibility an essential prerequisite for optimal 
stabilization policy. 
Implications for endogenous OCA  On empirical and historical ground, 
however, the above considerations also provide a new perspective on OCA. Building 
30on the maintained hypothesis of ‘local-currency pricing’, the idea is that the relative 
performance of a currency union may improve with the emergence of similar 
consumption patterns across countries joining the union. 
In a well-known contribution, Frankel and Rose (1998) build a case for 
‘endogenous currency areas’ stressing that, even if countries joining a monetary 
union do not satisfy the conditions for an OCA, they may do so over time, as 
economic integration fosters intra-industry over inter-industry trade, reducing the 
extent of specialization in production. Taking the logic of the argument above a step 
further, one could build a totally different argument. Namely, countries joining a 
common currency lose nothing in terms of stabilization efficiency relative to a regime 
with independent monetary policies, even if a common currency leads to 
specialization in production and inter-industry trade. The key point is that economic 
monetary and economic integration must foster convergence in consumption patterns 
in the countries of the union.
Observe that this argument could shed some light on a long-lasting question in 
European monetary study, regarding the reasons why European policy leaders have 
traditionally shown a preference for fixed exchange rates at regional level. Based on 
the results above, a possible answer lies in a sceptical view about the role of exchange 
rates in adjusting relative prices among relatively open European countries, coupled 
with the observation that production and consumption patterns for Europe as a whole 
are not too different. 
9 Extensions of the analysis and directions for future 
research 
To conclude this text, it is appropriate to discuss briefly the implications for our 
analysis of different assumptions about nominal price rigidities, fiscal and monetary 
policy interactions, and the degree of development of financial markets. 
9.1 Policy trade-offs when price adjustment is staggered 
In the baseline model adopted in this text, prices are assumed to be predetermined 
and fixed during each production period, and simultaneously updated between 
periods. In models with partial price adjustment, incomplete stabilization of output 
gaps generates inflation variability and inflation dispersion. Differences in inflation 
rates across countries (or sectors) may reflect desirable adjustment in international 
relative prices — and therefore be welfare-enhancing. However, to the extent that 
31price adjustment is staggered, a correction of international relative price can only 
materialize over time, at the costs of price dispersion, which is well known to have 
important negative implications on efficiency. With staggered adjustment, positive 
inflation means that the market price of ex-ante symmetric goods in preferences and 
production is not necessarily symmetric. Hence, the design of optimal monetary 
policy in a currency union must address the trade-off between the benefit of fostering 
relative price adjustment across types of goods (e.g. domestic versus foreign goods, 
and tradables versus nontradables), and its costs in terms of relative price distortions 
within each category of goods (see Corsetti et al. 2007). 
Elaborating on this trade-off, recent contributions have elaborated on the principle 
that central banks should target inflation in those sectors/countries that have the 
highest degree of nominal rigidities. The reason is apparent. Suppose some 
fundamental shock creates the need for adjustment in relative prices across different 
types of goods, or across countries. In response to these shocks, it is highly inefficient 
to place the burden of price adjustment on sectors/countries that have high and 
persistent nominal rigidities. If policy makers try to do so, adjustment will take time, 
and it will be costly due to distortions in relative prices of similar goods — since 
some firms will happen to adjust prices early on, others will happen to adjust prices at 
a later time. Conversely, it is efficient to pursue policies that target desired relative 
price adjustment via nominal price changes in the most flexible sectors or countries 
of the union. Clearly, adjustment will be faster and less costly.
22
The implementation of this principle is however more controversial than appears. 
Suppose that one can provide empirical evidence that the degree of nominal price or 
wage rigidity is higher in a particular country. Unless there are fundamental reasons 
to expect these rigidities to persist over time and be extremely costly to remove, 
increasing the weight of this country in union-wide policy making would possibly 
reduce the incentive to implement reforms that could in principle bring this economy 
in line with the rest of the union. 
9.2 Fiscal and monetary policy interactions 
An important policy conclusion from the traditional OCA theory is that monetary 
union challenges domestic policy makers to find alternative instruments of business 
cycle stabilization, or implement reforms that attenuate the adverse effects of cyclical 
shocks. These conclusions are still valid in the above analysis — it is indeed desirable 
to use additional policy instruments, such as fiscal policy. 
22 Observe that the analysis of the Nash equilibrium in Section 6 (where import prices are flexible in 
local currency) and Section 7 (where import prices are sticky in local currency) can be interpreted as 
an application of the same principle. 
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instruments available to the government, the distortionary nature of taxation, and 
financial and nominal frictions affecting the transmission of demand and tax shocks. 
The macro literature has moved some steps towards more realistic and articulated 
models of fiscal stabilization, accounting for distortionary taxes and spending on 
useful public goods, and/or introducing liquidity constrained agents in general 
equilibrium models. 
A key contribution to OCA theory in this respect is provided by Adao et al. 
(2006), a paper which, to a large extent, can be interpreted as a micro-founded 
reconsideration of the OCA literature, where the traditional focus on monetary policy 
is replaced by a novel focus on fiscal measures. These authors show that, if the 
government has enough tax instruments, including income and consumption taxes, 
there exists a fiscal regime with state contingent tax rates which support a flexible-
price equilibrium independently of nominal rigidities and the exchange rate 
(monetary policy) regime. Intuitively, with enough instruments to affect all the 
relevant decisions margins for households and firms, fiscal policy can ensure that 
relative prices across countries and sectors, and the level of aggregate demand, are the 
same as in the (Pareto-efficient) allocation.
23  There is no meaningful monetary-fiscal 
interaction.
This paper thus provides an important benchmark for virtually all other studies on 
the subject, which typically proceed by (realistically) constraining the set of fiscal 
instruments available to the policymakers. In the same vein, in the rest of this section 
I briefly sketch an analysis of fiscal policy in a monetary union abstracting from 
state-contingent taxes on income and consumption, as an extension of the framework 
adopted in the text above (see Beetsma and Jensen 2005 and Galì and Monacelli 
(2005) among others). Suppose domestic government spending falls on useful public 
goods which provide utility to the representative consumer in the country, and that 
such spending is financed through lump-sum taxation. In a Pareto-efficient allocation, 
government spending should be higher in periods when productivity is also high, 
since it is efficient to produce more (private and public) goods in those periods. To 
characterize an equilibrium allocation with an optimal policy mix, recall the main 
result of the previous section: with nominal rigidities, monetary policy should be 
expansionary when productivity is high. These considerations suggest that monetary 
23 Interestingly, Adao et al. (2006) build an economy where lack of labour mobility across the border is 
by no means an impediment to optimal stabilization. Rather, it is a prerequisite to it, since optimal 
labour income and consumption taxes are not efficient if workers can arbitrage net wages across 
markets. 
33policy and fiscal policy should both be expansionary in response to a positive 
productivity shock. 
In a monetary union, however, it is reasonable to expect that the correlation 
between these two policies be lower than in a regime of flexible exchange rates. 
Specifically, consider the optimal single monetary response to a positive productivity 
shock in the Home country. As this shock raises average productivity in the union as 
a whole, monetary policy will be expansionary, raising both domestic and foreign 
private consumption. But since by assumption productivity has not changed in the 
Foreign country, the single monetary policy will move output gaps in different 
directions: output will be too low in the Home country (since the shock is not fully 
stabilized); it will be too high in the Foreign country. What about fiscal policy? 
Clearly, it will be optimal to expand government spending on public goods in the 
Home country, where productivity is high. It will not be optimal to raise public 
spending in the Foreign country, where productivity has not changed. Actually, 
welfare could be improved by reducing, at the margin, public activity, to compensate 
(at least partially) for the high employment rates driven by monetary policy. 
In a monetary union, therefore, the optimal policy mix differs at national level, 
requiring fiscal policy to be anti-cyclical depending on domestic conditions. In the 
countries experiencing positive productivity shocks, fiscal and monetary policy will 
both be expansionary. In the countries not experiencing these shocks, fiscal policy 
should be used to cool down the national economy response to a monetary shock 
motivated by cyclical conditions elsewhere in the union. This is clearly not optimal, 
relative to the benchmark case of complete stabilization and efficient provision of 
public goods. 
9.3 Financial issues
The analysis of fiscal policy sketched above is based on a model which abstracts 
from liquidity and/or borrowing constraints. In their presence, Ricardian equivalence 
no longer holds: spending and taxation policy can also have a direct effect on private 
consumption through disposable income. The analysis also abstracts from issues 
related to fiscal solvency and loss of seigniorage revenue, as well as from noisy 
behaviour in financial markets. Including these elements in a formal model would 
clearly enhance our understanding of the macroeconomic policy trade-offs in a 
currency union. 
However, when focusing on fiscal and monetary interactions, it is important to 
keep in mind that increasing participation in financial markets and market 
development has arguably relaxed the frictions underlying the traditional output 
34multiplier process, stressed by the conventional analysis of budget policy. 
Deregulation and liberalization of financial markets may be expected to undermine 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool, consistent with the evidence 
provided by Perotti 2005, that multipliers tend to be lower after 1980s than before. 
The unwelcome implication is that, to the extent that monetary union enhances 
financial integration and development, fiscal stabilization correspondingly becomes 
less appealing as a substitute for monetary policy from an aggregate perspective
24 --- 
while of course it may still be quite powerful in correcting market distortions, or 
providing insurance for specific groups of agents with limited or no access to 
financial markets.
25
In light of these considerations, a research agenda on the role of financial market 
development in monetary unions appears the most promising, and high-priority, area 
where to concentrate theoretical and empirical analyses on OCA. By eliminating 
currency risk and reducing transaction costs within the euro area, the introduction of 
the new European currency has arguably boosted European financial market 
integration. A core question is the extent to which enhanced opportunities to borrow 
and share risk through portfolio diversification achievable in a currency union can 
contribute to reduce the welfare consequences of the stabilization deficits (see e.g. 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2005). A second related core question is the extent to which 
monetary and financial authorities in a common currency area can foster financial 
stability. The answer to these questions is particularly intriguing, as it is well 
understood that the transmission of shocks across countries and sectors can be 
fundamentally different across economies with different structures of financial 
markets (see Sutherland 2004). 
Appropriately developed, these are chapters of the OCA theory which could 
provide substantial contributions to institutional and policy design. 
24 As a caveat, even with integrated financial markets, financial turmoil and liquidity crises could 
cause temporary exacerbations of borrowing constraints, arguably improving the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy as an instrument of output stabilization. The social value of spending and taxation measures 
rises when cyclical fluctuations are rooted in financial stress which interferes with the normal 
functioning of credit markets. 
25 Another reason for scepticism on the role of fiscal policy is that countries have become much 
more open to trade, and monetary union is expected to foster trade integration even above global trends 
--- a point amply debated in the empirically controversy after Rose (2000), and also discussed in the 
text in relation to the convergence of consumption patterns. According to the received wisdom, 
increasing openness raises the magnitude of international spillovers from fiscal policy, while muting 
its effects on the demand for domestic output.
3510 Conclusions
The adoption of a common currency has fostered European economic integration 
and given many European countries the benefits of low inflation and financial 
stability. It is well understood, however, that a single monetary policy cannot deliver 
efficient business cycle stabilization at national level, relative to an ideal benchmark 
in which region-specific monetary policy stabilizes domestic output gaps and 
marginal costs. 
The analysis in this paper reconsidered the foundations of traditional OCA theory 
in light of recent advances in monetary theory. The exercise sheds new light on two 
fundamental principles which shape conventional wisdom. First, aggregate welfare 
losses from monetary unification are found to be small — arguably smaller than the 
benefits from joining a disciplined currency area for countries without a stable and 
efficient macroeconomic policy framework. Current and future advances in the 
literature may of course refine our understanding of the transmission of shocks 
causing cyclical fluctuations, perhaps challenging the current conventional wisdom 
on welfare losses from lack of stabilization. Even so, it will still be necessary to 
verify the extent to which stabilization issues can outweigh other benefits from 
monetary unification. 
Second, specialization in production and asymmetric cyclical shocks do not 
necessarily make a common monetary policy less efficient than nationally 
differentiated policies, for two reasons. First, exchange rate movements do not 
necessarily perform the stabilizing role envisioned by the traditional theory — this is 
the case when import prices are preset in local currency. In this respect, it is worth 
stressing that, historically, supporters of a European currency union have often shared 
a high degree of scepticism on the benefits from exchange rate flexibility. Second, 
and most importantly, monetary unification may foster processes of convergence in 
the composition of spending at national level. Convergence in spending patterns tends 
to make the policy stance which is optimal at regional level more symmetric across 
different regions in the union, even if regional shocks are uncorrelated and local 
production is specialized. Convergence of spending patterns emerges as a potential 
novel attribute of successful monetary unions. 
36References 
[1] Adao, B., I. Correia and P. Teles (2003), “Gaps and Triangles”, Review of 
Economic Studies, 70(4), pp. 699-713. 
[2] Adao, B., I. Correia, and P. Teles (2005), “Monetary Policy with Single 
Instrument Feedback Rules”, Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion 
Paper 4948. 
[3] Adao, B., I. Correia and P. Teles (2006), “On the Relevance of Exchange Rate 
Regimes for Stabilization Policy”, Center for Economic Policy Research 
Discussion Paper 5797.
[4] Beetsma R. and H. Jensen (2005), “Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in a 
Micro-founded model of a Monetary Union”, Journal of International 
Economics, 67, 320-352. 
[5] Benigno, P. (2004), “Optimal Monetary Policy in a Currency Area”, Journal of 
International Economics, 63 (2), pp. 293-320. 
[6] Bergin, P. and G. Corsetti (2005), “Towards a theory of firm entry and 
stabilization policy”, NBER wp 11821, Center for Economic Policy Research 
Discussion Paper 5376.
[7] Buiter W. (2000), “Optimal Currency Areas: Why does the Exchange Rate 
Regime Matter? With an application to UK Membership in EMU”, Scottish
Journal of Political Economy, 47(3), pp. 213-250. 
[8] Cole, H. L. and M. Obstfeld [1991], “Commodity Trade and International Risk 
Sharing: How Much Do Finacial Markets Matter?”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 28, pp. 3-24. 
[9] Corsetti, G. (2006), “Openness and the case for flexible exchange rates”, 
Research and Economics (60) 1-21. 
[10] Corsetti, G. (2008), “New Open Economy Macroeconomics”, in Durlauf, 
Stephen and Lawrence Blume (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics, Second edition, Palgrave Mcmillan. 
[11] Corsetti, G. and L. Dedola (2005), “A Macroeconomic model of price 
discrimination”, Journal of International Economics, 67(1), 129-156. 
[12] Corsetti, G., L. Dedola and S. Leduc (2007), “Optimal Monetary Policy and the 
Source of Local-Currency Price Stability”, Center for Economic Policy 
Research Discussion Paper 6557.
[13] Corsetti, G., P. Martin and P. Pesenti (2005), “Productivity spillovers, terms of 
trade and the ‘home market effect’”, Center for Economic Policy Research 
Discussion Paper 6492.
[14] Corsetti, G. and P. Pesenti (2005a), “International Dimensions of Optimal 
Monetary Policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(2) 281-305. 
37[15] Corsetti, G. and P. Pesenti (2005b), “The simple geometry of transmission and 
stabilization in closed and open economy”, Center for Economic Policy 
Research Discussion Paper 5080. ISOM 2007, forthcoming. 
[16] Devereux, M. B. and C. Engel (2003), “Monetary Policy in the Open Economy 
Revisited: Price Setting and Exchange Rate Flexibility”, Review of Economic 
Studies, 70, pp. 765-783. 
[17] Duarte, M. and M. Obstfeld (2004), “Monetary Policy in Open Economy 
Rivisited: The Case for Exchange-Rate Flexibility Restored”, mimeo, 
University of California, Berkeley, Forthcoming in Journal of International 
Money and Finance, 2007. 
[18] Erceg, C., D. Henderson, and A. Levin (2000), “Optimal monetary policy with 
staggered wage and price contracts”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 
46(2), pp 281-313. 
[19] Frankel, J. A. and A. K. Rose (1998), “The Endogeneity of the Optimum 
Currency Area Criteria”, Economic Journal, 108 (449), July, pp. 1009-25. 
[20] Friedman, M. (1953), “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,” reprinted in 
Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 
157-203.
[21] Galí, J. (2008), Monetary Policy, Inflation and the Business Cycle: An 
Introduction to the New Keynesian Framework, Princetown University Press 
[22] Galì, J. and T. Monacelli (2005), “Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union”, 
Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 5374.
[23] Ghironi, F. and M. Melitz (2005), “International Trade and Macroeconomics 
Dynamics with Heterogenous Firms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, (120), 
865-915.
[24] Goldberg, P. K., F. Verboven (2001), “The evolution of price dispersion in the 
european car market," Review of Economic Studies 68, 811-48. 
[25] Ingram, J. (1973), The Case for European Monetary Integration, Princeton 
Essays in International Finance No.98, Princeton NJ, Princeton University, 
International Finance Section.
[26] Kalemli-Ozcan, S., B. Sorensen, and O. Yosha (2005), “Asymmetric Shocks 
and Risk Sharing in a Monetary Union: Updated Evidence and Policy 
Implications for Europe”, in Huizinga H. and L. Yonung (eds), The
Internationalization of Asset Ownership in Europe, Cambridge University 
Press.
[27] Kenen, P. (1969), “The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic 
View”, reprinted in Exchange Rates and the Monetary System: Selected Essays 
of Peter B. Kenen, Aldershot: Elgar, 1994, pp. 3-22. 
38[28] Krugman, P. (1993), “Integration, Specialization and Regional Growth: Notes 
on 1992”, in Torres, Francisco and Francesco Giavazzi, eds. Adjustment and 
growth in the European Monetary Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
[29] Lucas, R. E., Jr. (2003), “Macroeconomic Priorities”, American Economic 
Review, March, pp. 1-14. 
[30] Lucas, R. E., Jr. (1987), Model of Business Cycles, Basil Blackwell 
[31] McKinnon, R. (1963), “Optimum Currency Areas”, American Economic 
Review, 53, September, pp. 717-724. 
[32] Mundell, R. (1961), “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”, American
Economic Review, 51, September, pp. 657-664. 
[33] Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff (1995), “Exchange rate dynamics redux”, Journal
of Political Economics, 102, 624-60. 
[34] Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff (1996), Foundations of International 
Macroeconomics, MIT press. 
[35] Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff (2002), “Global Implications of Self-Oriented 
National Monetary Rules”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (2), pp. 503 - 
535.
[36] Perotti, R. (2005), “Estimating the effects of fiscal policy in OECD countries”, 
Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 4842.
[37] Rose, A. (2000), “One money, one market: the effect of common currencies on 
trade”, Economic Policy, vol. 15(30), pp. 7-46. 
[38] Sutherland, A. (2004), “International Monetary Policy Coordination and 
Financial Market Integration”, Center for Economic Policy Research 
Discussion Paper 4251.
[39] Woodford, M. (2003), Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of 
Monetary Policy, Princeton University Press. 
39